Incumbency and action as realistic premises of a normative system of criminal indictment. critical considerations on the thought of Jakobs and Pawlik
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17398/2695-7728.38.395Keywords:
Action. Omission. Negative duty. Positive duty. Responsibility. Incumbency. Legal interest. Mandate. Prohibition. Duty to bear. Duty to omit. Conflict of duties. Normativism. Naturalism. Crime theory.Abstract
In order to be able to speak of the crime as a breach of a duty (negative or positive), it is required an action or the omission of an action through which to configure such duty. What is imputed as a breach of duty will always be either an action or the omission of an action, not being indifferent if it is one or the other.
In conflicts of duties and their corresponding obligations to bear or to save, action is useful for modulating obligation. The obligation to save a legal interest ceases long before the obligation not to sacrifice the interest that would need to be sacrificed approximates the value of that one which the legal system would like to save, being necessary to keep here also the distinction between action and omission.
A minimum fastening of normativism to reality is necessary to link it to the recipient of the norm, without which the norm lacks potentiality or guidance for the recipient about the sense in which he must transform reality in accordance with the will of the norm. What is only conceivable through actions of the person capable of carrying them out (or omitting them). Observing this minimum structure, normativism is possible without restrictions.
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